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This article was prepared for and presented at the 2009 Richard C. 
Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy, held on 
March 9, 2009, at the University Of Akron School Of Law. 1 
• Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. To reflect recent court activity, this paper has been slightly modified from the one 
distributed at the Symposium in March 2009. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last year, the landscape of patent law was altered by court 
opinions from the Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, as well as in opinions rendered by the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (hereafter BP AI) at the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office. In addition, patent reform legislation was 
introduced that could have shaken up patent practice even further. 
Although none of the reform proposals were passed, revised versions of 
these legislative initiatives have already been introduced in 2009.2 This 
brief write-up summarizes many (but by no means all) of the important 
developments in patent law in 2008 and early 2009. 
II. PATENT ABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
.§l.Q.l: Patent eligible subject matter rose to the forefront in 2008 
with the en bane decision in In re Bilski. 3 In Bilski, the Federal Circuit 
overturned the "useful, concrete, and tangible result'.4 test for business 
methods and software inventions from State Street Bank and its 
progeny.5 In its place, the court set up a test that requires the invention 
to be implemented by a particular machine or to involve a physical 
transformation.6 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari and will 
hear the case next term. 7 I am not hopeful that the Supreme Court will 
overturn Bilski, so it is likely the practical applications and nuances of 
the "machine or transformation" test will continue to play out over the 
next few years. Cases from the BP AI are already addressing the issue at 
an alarming rate. See for example, Ex parte Atkin, Ex parte Gutto, Ex 
parte Barnes, and Ex parte Becker.8 
2. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act 2009, S. 515, !lith Cong. §35 (2009), available at 
http://www.opencongress.orglbill/lll-s515/text (the latest proposed patent reform act which passed 
out of the Senate Judiciary Committee April3, 2009); Fish and Richardson P.C., Fish News: 2009 
Patent Reform Update, http://www.fr.com/news/articledetail.cfrn?articleid=490&gclid=CKCh6sb 
gz5kCFQdN5QodzzTt5Q (last visited April 4, 2009) (for a summary of current action on these 
bills). 
3. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
4. /d. at 959. 
5. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
6. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960. 
7. Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964,2009 U.S. LEXIS 4103 (U.S. June I, 2009). 
8. See, e.g., Ex pane Atkin, B.P.A.I. Appeal 2008-4352 (2009); Ex pane Gutta, B.P.A.I. 
Appeal 2008-4352 (2009); Ex parte Barnes, B.P.A.I. Appeal 2007-4114 (2009); Ex parte Becker, 
B.P.A.I. 2008-2064 (2009) (BPAI decisions can be quickly accessed from the e-FOIA/Patent Office 
website by searching for the case name (e.g., "Ex Parte Atkin") in an internet search engine, such as 
Google). 
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Further, this issue is extending beyond the business method and 
software realm into other fields, such as medical diagnosis. For 
example, in Classen v. Biogeo, the Federal Circuit's three-sentence 
opinion affirmed the district court's finding of invalidity under §101.9 In 
the pending case Prometheus v. Mayo, 10 the district court found a 
method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy by administering a particular 
drug to a patient and then using the patient's metabolite level to adjust 
future drug doses, to be ineligible subject matter. 11 
As the Bilski case was the sole topic for another panel at the 
Richard C. Sughrue Symposium, 12 I will leave this summary very brief, 
although I believe there is much more to say on the matter. 13 
A. §102: 
There is not much new on the anticipation/statutory bar front, but 
one interesting case relating to § 102 this year is the Federal Circuit's 
decision in SRI Int '1, Inc. v. internet Security Systems Inc., 14 where the 
court addressed what may be required for a "publication" on the Internet. 
Here, before the critical date, an inventor posted a paper on an FTP 
server and sent an e-mail to a small group of people announcing the 
presence of the paper. 15 While the district court held this activity to 
constitute a "publication" for purposes of § 102, the Federal Circuit 
disagreed. 16 In particular, the court noted that there was no evidence 
that, in 1997, a person skilled in the art could have gained access to the 
FTP server and navigated through a generic directory structure to obtain 
the paper in question. 17 Further, the court found the paper had not been 
9. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25661 (Fed. Cir. 
Dec. 19, 2008). 
10. Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH(RBB), 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25062 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), appeal docketed, No. 2008-1403 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22 
2009). 
II. Prometheus Labs., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25062, at *14. 
12. Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy at the University 
of Akron School of Law (March 9, 2009) (other panels at the conference covered Egyptian Goddess 
and Bilski in more depth, and while very important, this paper does not extensively detail them). 
13. In fact, I have written on this topic even before the Bilski opinion came out. See Kristen 
Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1087 (2007) (my 
arguments in that piece, namely that the courts and the Patent Office are using § 101 rejections as 
proxies for inquiries made more appropriately under other patentability requirements, remain timely 
today, and in fact are quite similar to arguments raised in some Supreme Court briefing). 
14. SRI Int'l, v. Internet Sec. Sys., 511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
15. See id. at 1190. 
16. See id. at 1192. 
17. Seeid. at 1197. 
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catalogued or indexed in any meaningful way. 18 Judge Moore dissented, 
stating that the court's previous line of cases required this in fact to be 
considered a publication. 19 
Another interesting case is Net Moneyin, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc. 20 In 
this case, although a prior art reference disclosed all the elements of the 
claim, the elements in the prior art reference were not arranged or 
combined in the same way as in the claim; rather the elements were 
disclosed in different embodiments.21 The Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court's finding of anticipation, holding that anticipation requires 
more than simply finding each element within a single prior art 
reference.22 The invention, which must be disclosed in the anticipating 
reference, must include both the claimed elements and the claimed 
arrangement thereof.23 Due to the fact that neither embodiment in the 
prior art reference contained all the claimed elements in the claimed 
arrangement, there was no anticipation.24 
B. §103: 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit fleshed out some of the implications of 
the 2007 Supreme Court case, KSR v. Teleflex.25 KSR heightened the 
standard for non-obviousness by allowing the combination of prior art in 
the absence of a "teaching, motivation, or suggestion" to combine, the 
test the Federal Circuit had been using.26 Now, after KSR, while a 
"teaching, motivation, or suggestion" to combine remains viable, it is 
not necessary; obviousness can be found so long as it would have been 
reasonable for a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine the 
pieces of prior art, such as in KSR, where previously known elements 
were combined without an overall change in function or performance.27 
One of the most important cases on this issue is Muniauction, Inc. 
v. Thomson Corp. 28 Muniauction owned a patent directed towards 
conducting municipal bond auctions over the Intemet.29 A jury found 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 1201-02 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
20. Net Moneyin Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
21. Jd at 1370. 
22. Jd. at 1371. 
23. See id. at 1370. 
24. See id. at 1371. 
25. KSR Int'1 Co. v. Te1eflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
26. Jd at415. 
27. See id. at 422. 
28. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
29. Id at 1321-22. 
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 307 
Thomson liable for infringement of the patent and awarded Muniauction 
$77 million.30 Thomson appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing the 
patent was obvious, and the Federal Circuit agreed.31 The court first 
noted that the patent itself stated that internet technology and web 
browsers were conventional and well-known. 32 The court then stated 
that "adapting existing electronic processes to incorporate modem 
internet and web browser technology was similarly commonplace" at the 
time the patent application was ftled. 33 Therefore, the combination was 
obvious.34 Given this broad application of KSR, it is questionable 
whether any electronic technology transformed for web-based use would 
be found non-obvious. 35 
Another important post-KSR case is Eisai v. Dr. Reddy's Labs. 36 In 
this case, the Federal Circuit explained that KSR will often not apply in 
chemical compound cases, even where the individual components of the 
claimed compound are often previously known?7 "To the extent an art 
is unpredictable, as the chemical arts often are, KSR's focus on these 
'identified, predictable solutions' may present a difficult hurdle because 
potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely predictable".38 Rather, 
for chemical cases, the prima facie case for obviousness begins with the 
identification of a lead compound in the prior art.39 Then, obviousness 
can be based on the structural similarity between the lead compound and 
the claimed compound, along with some motivation that would lead a 
skilled artisan to make the modification.40 Mo6vation can be shown by 
a close relationship between the prior art and the new compound that 
would make the substitution predictable.41 
Obviousness in biotech cases is still up in the air following Ex parte 
Kubin from the BPAI.42 In Kubin, for which the Federal Circuit heard 
30. /d. at 1321. 
31. /d. (rejecting the patent on grounds of obviousness). 
32. See id. at 1326. 
33. /d. at 1327. 
34. /d. 
35. See KSR Int'1 Co. v. Te1eflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
36. Esai Co. Ltd. V. Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd, 533 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
37. See id. at 1356. 
38. /d. at 1358. 
39. See id. at 1358. 
40. See id. at 1357. 
41. See id. 
42. See, Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 (2007). 
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an oral argument in January 200943, the BPAI found a "nucleic acid 
molecule" claim obvious over the prior art.44 Although the molecule's 
structure was not similar to other regulator proteins, and although 
protein folding is an unpredictable art,45 the BPAI held the claim 
obvious because the molecule in question could have been isolated and 
verified using conventional techniques46 - that is, it would have been 
obvious to try.47 This argument of "obvious to try" had been previously 
rejected by the Federal Circuit in In re Deuel, 48 but the BPAI held that 
KSR limited Deuel and that the invention in this case was simply a 
product of "ordinary skill and common sense. '.49 As this article was 
going to press, the Federal Circuit decided In re Kubin and affirmed the 
BPAI's opinion.50 The Federal Circuit's opinion resurrects the 'obvious 
to try' analysis, although an invention that is obvious to try is not 
necessarily obvious.51 How this plays out in the ever-advancing field of 
biotechnology will be seen over the next few years. 
c. §112: 
There is not much new to report with respect to enablement, best 
mode, or written description. The Federal Circuit continues to hold 
broad claims invalid in the absence of sufficient support, either in the 
form of multiple embodiments or a single embodiment with enough 
detail supporting multiple configurations.52 See for example, In re 
Alonso, which found that in an unpredictable art (here treating 
neurofibrosarcomas using antibody reagents) a single embodiment is 
insufficient. 53 
Even in predictable electrical and mechanical arts, the Federal 
Circuit is requiring the full scope to be enabled by the specification to 
43. Donald Zuhn, Kubin Panel Questions Motivation Behind Reversal in New Written Description 
Training Materials, PATENTDocs, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.patentdocs.orW2009/0l/kubin-panel-questions-
motivation-behind-reversal-in-new-written-description-training-materials.htrnl. 
44. See generally Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 at *5, *7. 
45. !d. at *13 (molecular biology ... generally an unpredictable art). 
46. !d. at *5. 
47. See Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 at *8. 
48. In re DeueL 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
49. Ex Parte Kubin, B.P.A.I. Appeal No. 2007-0819 at *9. 
50. See, In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (the US Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit decided the case on April 3, 2009. The court of appeals indicated that the KSR standard for 
biotechnology was not simply obviousness, but obvious to try. In making its decision, the Court 
expressly overruled Deuel). 
51. !d. 
52. See, e.g., In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
53. !d. 
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uphold validity.54 See for example, Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC.55 In 
this case, although the claim was broad enough to cover video games 
and movies, the specification only discussed video games. 56 The 
evidence showed that movies were quite different from video games, 
and thus the court held the patent invalid for failure to enable the full 
scope. 57 
As far as claim definiteness under § 112, the court issued a couple 
opinions dealing with the propriety of functional language. In 
Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., the 
claims at issue included both structural and functional language. 58 In 
particular, claim 1 was written as follows: 
A method of executing instructions in a pipelined processor 
comprising: 
[structural limitations of processor]; 
the method further comprising: 
[method steps implemented in the processor].59 
Despite the unconventional nature of the claim,60 the Federal 
Circuit explained that the claim was not indefinite and was "clearly 
limited to practicing the claimed method in a pipelined processor 
possessing the requisite structure."61 
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd., v. International 
Game Technology, 62 the Federal Circuit dealt a blow, however, to using 
functional claim language in computer apparatus systems. 63 The claim 
language at issue was "game control means,"64 which falls under §112, 
para. 6, "means plus function" analysis.65 The specification discussed 
only that the means included a programmed general purpose computer.66 
The court held that this was insufficient because "general purpose 
computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very 
54. See, e.g., Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
55. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
56. /d. at 1000. 
57. !d. at 998. 
58. Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
59. /d. at 1374. 
60. U.S. Patent No. 5,471,593 (filed Jan. 21, 1994). 
61. Microprocessor Enhancement Corp., 520 F.3d at 1375. 
62. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
63. !d. 
64. !d. at 1335. 
65. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (1975). 
66. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd., 521 F.3d at 1328-33. 
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different ways," so "simply disclosing a computer as the structure 
designated to perform a particular function" does not provide 
appropriate limits on the patent's scope and is thus invalid.67 
Ill. PATENT PROSECUTION ISSUES 
No discussion of 2008 would be complete without a mention of 
Tafas v. Dudai8 (now captioned Tafas v. Doff\ the enormous battle 
over whether the Patent Office has the power to implement substantive 
prosecution rules with respect to continuation applications and 
limitations on the number of claims.70 Tafas complained that the Patent 
Office had exceeded the rule-making authority it had been delegated by 
Congress.71 After imposing an injunction to keep the Patent Office from 
implementing the new rules, the District Court found the rules to be 
substantive in nature and thus outside the scope of the Patent Office's 
power.72 The Patent Office appealed to the Federal Circuit and 
arguments were held in December 2008.73 It is unclear to what extent, if 
at all, the new administration will pursue this case. 
A. Patent Enforcement Issues: Venue & Jurisdiction 
This year may have marked the end of the Eastern District of 
Texas's reign as the hotbed of patent infringement cases. The Fifth 
Circuit, in In re Volkswagen of America, Inc.,14 held that the judges in 
the Eastern District of Texas must follow the federal change of venue 
statute, 28 U.S.C. §1404, when deciding motions to transfer cases.75 In 
particular, the district courts should no longer allow the plaintiff's choice 
of forum to trump all other considerations, such as the location of 
witnesses and other matters of convenience.76 
On this issue, the Federal Circuit follows the law of the circuit in 
which the district court resides and has adopted the same viewpoint as 
the Volkswagen court. In TS Tech USA Corp., the Federal Circuit 
67. !d. at 1333. 
68. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
69. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
70. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
71. !d. at 811. 
72. !d. at 814. 
73. Audio of Oral Argument, Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (No. 2008-1352) available at 
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2008-1352.mp3. 
74. In re Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008). 
75. !d. at 326. 
76. !d. at 315. 
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responded to a petition for writ of mandamus by ordering a patent case 
transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas.77 The Federal Circuit 
found that while Texas was a proper venue, Ohio was a far more 
appropriate venue, given the facts that the defendant company was 
headquartered in Ohio; the witnesses were located in Ohio, Michigan, 
and Canada; the physical evidence was in Ohio; and the state of Texas 
had no connection or interest in the case.78 
Between Volkswagen and TS Tech, patent infringement cases are 
starting to be transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas. Just 
recently, Judge Love of the Eastern District of Texas granted a motion to 
transfer in the case of Odom v. Microsoft,79 where the plaintiff was 
located in Oregon, the defendant was located in Washington, the conduct 
and contracts giving rise to the case occurred in the Pacific Northwest, 
and Texas had no particular interest in the case.80 
B. Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction: 
In the Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 81 case from 2007, the 
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's previous test for 
declaratory judgment (OJ) jurisdiction, namely that the OJ plaintiff has 
(1) a reasonable apprehension of suit and (2) has conducted meaningful 
preparation towards infringing activity.82 While Medimmune got rid of 
the first prong of the test, it apparently left the second prong intact.83 
This year, the Federal Circuit has given us a broader test for DJ 
jurisdiction in Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc. 84 The proper inquiry 
now is whether the totality of the circumstances shows there is a 
substantial controversy between parties having adverse interests of 
sufficient reality and immediacy to require DJ.85 Meaningful 
preparation is important, but not required, to show immediacy and 
reality.86 
77. See In re TS Tech. USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
78. !d. at 1320-23. 
79. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:08-CV-331, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9835, at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Jan. 30, 2009). 
80. Odom, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9835, at* 22-23. 
81. See generally Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
82. !d. at 132. 
83. See generally Medlmmune Inc., 549 U.S. at 129-37. 
84. Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
85. !d. at 879 (quoting Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007)). 
86. !d. 
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C. Jurisdiction over Foreign Patentees: 
In Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co., Ltd., the 
Federal Circuit held that a district court lacked jurisdiction over a 
foreign patentee in a declaratory judgment action.87 For specific 
jurisdiction to attach in DJ cases, a court must determine whether the 
claim arises out of or relates to the DJ defendant's contacts with the 
forum state.88 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that a threat letter 
alone is insufficient to create DJ jurisdiction and that there must be other 
activities related to the claim in the forum. 89 Here, the DJ plaintiff 
asserted there was jurisdiction based on an infringement letter mailed 
from Aten (a Taiwanese corporation) to Avocent (in Alabama); 
distribution of Aten products in Alabama by a subsidiary; and previous 
patent enforcement litigation by Aten in other fora.90 The Federal 
Circuit held that the previous patent enforcement was not relevant to this 
case or fora and that the distribution of a product by the patentee was not 
related to the DJ claim that the patent at issue was invalid and not 
infringed by Avocent.91 Thus, there was no personal jurisdiction over 
Aten.92 
N. PATENT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES: INFRINGEMENT 
A. Design Patent Infringement: 
The Federal Circuit altered the analysis for finding infringement of 
design patents in its en bane decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 
Inc. 93 This case, like Bilski, was the subject of another panel at the 
Richard C. Sughrue Symposium and therefore is not covered extensively 
in this paper.94 Simply noted, the court abolished the "point of novelty" 
prong of the infringement inquiry for design patents. 95 
87. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int'l Co., Ltd., 552 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
88. See, e.g., Breckenridge Pharm. Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
89. Silent Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Red Wing 
Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (Fed.Cir.l998)). 
90. Id. at 1341. 
91. /d. at 1339-41. 
92. /d. at 1340. 
93. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane). 
94. Richard C. Sughrue Symposium on Intellectual Property Law and Policy at the University 
of Akron School of Law (March 9, 2009) (other panels at the conference covered Egyptian Goddess 
and Bilski in more depth, and while very important, this paper does not extensively detail them). 
95. Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d at 683. 
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B. Joint Infringement: 
In Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 96 the Federal Circuit also 
addressed the issue of infringement of a process patent, where all of the 
steps are not performed by the same party.97 In that case, the auction 
process included the steps of inputting data associated with a bid, 
automatically computing interest based on the inputted data, submitting 
the bid by transferring over an electronic network, and communicating a 
message associated with the bid, where at least one step is performed 
using a web browser.98 The problem is that the first step, inputting a bid, 
is done by a user of the system, while the rest of the steps are performed 
by the defendant (Thomson), who provides the software and access to 
the electronic network.99 The Federal Circuit held that there was no 
infringement because there was no one party that performed every step 
of the claimed process. 100 A petition for writ of certiorari in this case 
was denied by the Supreme Court on March 9, 2009.101 
C. Transnational Infringement: 
Although patent law is generally limited to activity that occurs in 
the United States, Congress has expanded the reach via §271(f), which 
prohibits supplying components of a patented device to be assembled 
abroad,102 and §271(g), which prohibits importation of products made 
abroad using patented processes.103 While the Federal Circuit had ruled 
in 2005 (in the Union Carbide v. Shell case)104 that §271(f) extends to 
components used in a claim method, this holding was made tenuous by 
the Supreme Court's decision in 2007 in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp.,105 which held that the shipment of golden master disks, 
containing patented processes in the form of software that were used for 
duplication abroad, did not fall under §271(f)'s purview. 106 However, 
this year, the Federal Circuit stated that the Supreme Court decision did 
96. See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1325-27 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
97. See Id at 1330. 
98. See ld at 1322-23. 
99. See ld at 1329. 
100. See Id at 1330. 
101. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. 
Ct. 1585 (2009). 
102. 35 u.s.c. §27l(f) (1984). 
103. 35 u.s.c. §27l(g) (1994). 
104. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
105. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
106. Id at 462. 
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not alter the §271(t) analysis with respect to supplying actual 
components used in patented processes (versus the golden master disks, 
which were copied onto the computer systems, and not themselves 
actually used).107 The defendant sought rehearing en bane to overturn 
Union Carbide, 108 and the petition was supported by some big-name 
amici, such as AIPLA 109 and a group of tech companies including 
Microsoft, Intel, and Oracle.110 The en bane rehearing was granted111 , 
and argument held May 29,2009, at the Federal Circuit.112 
D. Claim Construction: 
Although there has been no big news in claim construction 
jurisprudence this year, there have been many cases that point out the 
still-remaining need for something better. For example, Outside the Box 
Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc. 113 involved a patent on a very 
straightforward device - a bag used to store and carry tools such as used 
by an electrician. In this case, a three-judge panel of the Federal Circuit 
could not agree on the construction of the term "between."114 
E. Doctrine of Equivalents: 
Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE) continues to 
be very difficult to prove. After Festo115 limited application of the DOE 
to amended claims only in cases of unforeseeability, tangentiality, or 
failings of language, the court has shown repeatedly how these can bar a 
107. Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 2007-1296, No. 2007-1347, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 25475 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 18, 2008). 
108. Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 2007-1296, No. 2007-1347, 2009 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 4379 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 2009). 
109. Brief of Amici Curiae Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n & Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n in 
Support of Cross-Appellants' Petition For Rehearing En Bane, Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude 
Med., Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 2009) (No. 2007-1296, No. 2007-
1347), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/fcba-aipla-amicus-brief.pdf. 
II 0. Brief for Amici Curiae Cisco Systems, Inc., Intel Corp., Apple Inc., Oracle Corp., 
Microsoft Corp., and Symantec Corp., in Suport of Cross-Appellants' Petition For Rehearing En 
Bane, Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 
2009) (No. 2007-1296, No. 2007-1347), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/cardiac-amicus-
brief-O l-30-09.pdf. 
Ill. Cardiac Pacemakers, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379, at *2. 
112. Audio of Oral Argument, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4379 (No. 
2007 -1296-2) available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/2007-l296-2.mp3. 
113. Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., No. 2007-1253, 2008 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 813, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 15, 2008). 
114. Outside the Box Innovations, UC, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 813, at *10-ll. 
115. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ud., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
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finding of infringement. 116 In Honeywell Int 'I, Inc. v. Hamilton 
Sundstrand Corp.,111 the patentee argued that the accused infringer's 
equivalent was not foreseeable. 118 The court disagreed, stating that 
"[f]oreseeability does not require that the accused infringing product or 
process be foreseeable, nor that any equivalents exist at the time; rather, 
foreseeability only requires that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
have reasonably foreseen the proposed equivalent at the pertinent 
time."119 
F. Willful Infringement/Inducement to Infringe: 
In Seagate, 120 the Federal Circuit made it more difficult to establish 
willful infringement and obtain enhanced damages by removing the 
"affirmative duty of due care."121 In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm 
Inc., 122 the defendant argued that it could not be liable for inducement to 
infringe if it was not liable for willfulness under the Seagate standard. 123 
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding the inducement 
standard had not changed and that inducement does not require a finding 
of willfulness.124 Further, in finding the requisite intent for inducement 
(that the defendant "knew or should have known" that its action would 
cause direct infringement), the court held that advice of counsel (or 
failure to procure this advice) was relevant to the inducement inquiry. 125 
V. PATENT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES: DEFENSES 
A. Inequitable Conduct: 
This year saw the return of inequitable conduct, along with a 
heightened standard to keep it at bay. In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. 
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc./ 26 a patent was held to be 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 127 The behavior in question 
116. !d. at 740. 
117. Honeywelllnt'l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
118. /d. at 1311. 
119. /d. at 1314. 
120. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane). 
121. /d. at 1371. 
122. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
123. Id at 699. 
124. Id 
125. Id 
126. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
127. !d. at 1337. 
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was the failure to include material information in a declaration submitted 
to the Patent Office, but the intent of the patentee to deceive the Patent 
Office was shown only circumstantially at best. 128 Judge Rader, in 
dissent, suggested the court take a closer look at the intent necessary to 
find inequitable conduct, noting that "inequitable conduct has taken on a 
new life as a litigation tactic" and that it should be limited to "only the 
most extreme cases of fraud and deception."129 A petition for writ of 
certiorari at the Supreme Court has recently been filed by the patentee. 130 
The Federal Circuit followed up Aventis with Star Scientific, Inc. v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co. 131 In this case, the Federal Circuit stated 
that: 
Just as it is inequitable to permit a patentee who obtained his 
patent through deliberate misrepresentations or omissions of 
material information to enforce the patent against others, it is 
also inequitable to strike down an entire patent where the 
patentee only committed minor missteps or acted with minimal 
culpability or in good faith. 132 
The court thus required the infringer to prove the prongs of 
materiality and deceptive intent with clear and convincing evidence and 
noted that "inferences drawn from lesser evidence" will not satisfy the 
requirements. 133 
B. Patent Exhaustion: 
Following 2007, a year that saw a great number of Supreme Court 
cases in patent law, the primary Supreme Court patent case is Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 134 LG owned patents relating to 
method and system claims. 135 LG licensed these patents to Intel, 
granting Intel the right to make, use, and sell products covered by the 
patent; however, the license included a limitation that no license was 
granted to third-parties to combine licensed technology with non-Intel 
equipment. 136 Intel also agreed to tell its customers that they had no 
128. Id at 1342. 
129. ld. at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
130. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Phann. Inc, 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
131. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
132. !d. at 1366. 
133. Id 
134. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008). 
135. Id at 2113. 
136. Id at 2ll4. 
2009] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 317 
license to combine the Intel products with any other non-Intel parts. 137 
Quanta, a third-party, had purchased Intel's chips and combined them 
with other technology. LG sued Quanta for patent infringement. 138 
The District Court held that the license agreement between LG and 
Intel exhausted the patent right and there was no infringement. 139 The 
Federal Circuit reversed on two grounds: first, method claims could not 
be exhausted, and second, the license was conditional, and therefore, not 
exhausted. 140 The Supreme Court heard the case and ultimately 
determined that the patents were indeed exhausted and Quanta did not 
infringe. 141 
The Supreme Court's reasoning is as follows: the basic principle of 
patent exhaustion is that an authorized sale of a patented item ends any 
patent rights with respect to that item. 142 In fact, any item that 
"sufficiently embodies the patent - even if it does not completely 
practice the patent - such that its only and intended use is to be fmished 
under the terms of the patent" will invoke patent exhaustion. 143 The 
Court next reasoned that patent exhaustion can apply to method claims, 
although sale of a patented product is not necessarily a sale of a 
method. 144 
Applying this reasoning to Quanta, the Court concluded that Intel's 
parts were capable of use only in practicing LG's patents, and the 
relevant consideration is whether the products embody the patent's 
essential features. 145 The Court then determined that the products sold 
by Intel were licensed, but that this license did not restrict use of the 
products by Intel - the first license was thus unconditional. 146 Intel was 
licensed to make the products, and Intel was licensed to sell the products 
to Quanta. 147 Any further restrictions on Quanta (or any other third 
party) were not relevant to the inquiry of exhaustion. 148 
So what is important about this case? Patent exhaustion can apply 
to method claims as well as apparatus claims. Additionally, patent 
137. /d. 
138. /d. 
139. ld 
140. /d. at 2115. 
141. !d. at2122. 
142. /d.at2115. 
143. /d. at 2117. 
144. /d. 
145. /d. at 2119. 
146. Id at2122. 
147. Id 
148. !d. at2122. 
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exhaustion can be avoided by careful license drafting. The conditions 
and limitations must apply to the licensee, not to a third party, as was the 
case here. 149 
C. Erroneous Revival: 
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia v. IGT, the Federal Circuit 
held that improper revival of a patent application was not a defense to 
patent infringement. 150 The Patent Office did not have the authority to 
revive a national stage application that was unintentionally filed late, but 
it did revive the application and issue a patent based thereon. 151 When 
the resulting patent was then asserted in litigation, the accused infringer 
argued the Patent Office's improper revival constituted a defense of 
invalidity.152 The Federal Circuit, looking to §282, held there was no 
such defense. 153 This section of the Patent Act allows for the following 
defenses to allegations of patent infringement: non-infringement, 
invalidity based on conditions of patentability (defined by the court as 
utility, novelty, and non-obviousness), invalidity based on failure to 
comply with sections 112 or 251, or any other fact or act made a defense 
by the act.154 Thus, there is no recourse for an accused infringer to 
invalidate a patent based on procedural lapses by the Patent Office. 155 
VI. PATENT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES: REMEDIES 
A. Injunctions: 
In 2008, we also got a better idea of how the Federal Circuit is 
going to apply the four-factor test for injunctive relief that the Supreme 
Court required in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 156 For example, 
consider Voda v. Cordis Corp. 157 In this case, a jury found Cordis liable 
for patent infringement and awarded damages, but the district court 
denied entry of a permanent injunction.158 On appeal to the Federal 
149. See id. 
150. Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 543 F.Jd 657 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
151. /d. at 660. 
152. /d. at 662. 
153. !d. at 663. 
154. 35 u.s.c. § 112 (2007); 35 u.s.c. §251 (2007). 
155. See, e.g., Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
("Procedural lapses during examination, should they occur, do not provide grounds of invalidity."). 
156. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,391 (2006). 
157. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
158. Id at 1315. 
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Circuit, the court affirmed the denial of injunction because the patent 
owner had exclusively licensed the patent to a third party.159 Since the 
patent owner himself was not irreparably injured (even if the exclusive 
licensee may be), the court held that damages were sufficient to make 
the patentee whole. 160 
Licensing by the patentee, however, is not fatal. In Acumed LLC v. 
Stryker Corp., 161 the court upheld the entry of a permanent injunction, 
despite the fact that the patentee had previously licensed the patent to 
other manufacturers.162 The District Court had found that these prior 
licenses did not defeat the requirement of irreparable harm because the 
previous licensees were not direct competitors.163 The Federal Circuit 
noted that the "plaintiff's past willingness to license its patent is not 
sufficient per se to establish lack of irreparable harm if a new infringer 
were licensed."164 
One of the main questions after eBay165 was how non-practicing 
patent-holding entities (NPEs) would be treated. In Broadcom v. 
Qualcomm, the court provided some insight.166 In this case, Broadcom 
was a quasi-NPE, in that it was not making or selling the invention 
claimed in the asserted patents; it was, however, a competitor of 
Qualcomm based on an alternative chipset.167 This permitted the court 
to find irreparable harm. 168 Also interesting, is how the district court 
crafted the injunction to suit both the patentee and the public interest.169 
The injunction order contained a sunset provision that allowed 
Qualcomm to continue infringing for twenty months while paying a 
compulsory license, after which time it must cease infringing 
altogether. 170 This, the court reasoned, would allow Qualcomm to 
redesign and retool without interrupting service to its customers.171 It is 
not clear, however, how the courts will treat NPE's that do not compete 
on some level, such as patent holding companies or "patent trolls." 
159. !d. 
160. !d. at 1329. 
161. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
162. !d. at 1332. 
163. !d. at 1328. 
164. !d. 
165. 547 u.s. 388 (2006). 
166. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qua1comm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
167. See id. at 702. 
168. See id. at 703. 
169. See id. at 701. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
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B. Damages: 
Damages are likely to be a hot issue in 2009, both in the courts and 
in the legislature. Congress is contemplating damage apportionment as 
part of patent reform, and the courts are seeing the issue turn political as 
well.172 In particular, keep an eye on Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. 
Gateway, Inc., on appeal at the Federal Circuit, with the argument 
expected to be scheduled either late spring or early summer. 173 In that 
case, some $500 million in damages were awarded, even though only a 
portion of the accused device was infringing. 174 This case has turned 
into a prime exhibit in the Congressional debate about damages. 175 In 
any case, expect at least a lively debate about damages, if not wholesale 
change, in the coming year. 
VII. PATENT REFORM LEGISLATION 
Without a crystal ball, it is difficult to see what will happen with 
patent reform legislation in the new year. Certainly, a number of people 
are hopeful that the new administration will push forward, particularly 
given President Obama's Technology Agenda that calls for reforming 
the patent system to improve patent quality, and reduce uncertainty and 
waste. 176 However, during a time when there are certainly more pressing 
needs, patent reform may need to take a back seat for a while. Some hot 
(and controversial) issues in patent reform include legislation to exempt 
infringement of tax strategy patents by tax practitioners (similar to the 
medical treatment exception), damages apportionment, and expanded 
interlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings. 177 Other less 
controversial measures include harmonizing procedures, such as first-to-
172. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2009: Damages, Patent Reform Contemplation, 
PATENTLYO, March 3, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.cornlpatent/2009/03/patent-reform-2009-
damages.html. 
173. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 543 F.3d 710 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
174. !d. 
175. See, e.g., Manzullo & Michaud: New Patent Bill Encourages IP theft, Destroys American 
Jobs, http://manzullo.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentiD= 113152 (last visited 
April 3, 2009) (US Representative Don Manzullo, commenting that the patent reform bill would 
weaken IP protections by limiting damage awards in patent infringement cases); See also, Rick 
Merritt, Damages key to patent reform debate, EE TIMES, March 3, 2009, http://www.eetimes.cornl 
news/latest/show Article.jhtml?articleiD=215800319 (commenting on the patent reform bill, the 
debate on damages, the possibility of giving judges more latitude to instruct juries on how to reach a 
damages settlement, and bringing the United States to a first-to-file system). 
176. White House, The Technology Agenda, Improve America's Competitiveness, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/technology (last visited April3, 2009). 
177. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act 2009, PATENTLYO, March 3, 2009, 
http://www.patentlyo.cornlpatent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.htrnl. 
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file and post-grant oppositions.178 Patent reform legislation has been 
introduced to the current Congress, and hearings have been held on the 
controversial issue of damage apportionment. 179 It is possible that patent 
law is in for great changes in 2009. 180 
178. /d. 
179. See, e.g., Donald Zuhn, Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Patent Reform, 
PATENTDOCS, March 10, 2009, http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/03/senate-judiciary-committee-
holds-hearing-on-patent-refonn.htrnl (referring to testimony heard on the proposed patent reform). 
180. See, e.g., Kevin Noonan, Senate "Patent Reform" Bill (S. 515) Voted out of Judiciary 
Committee, PATENTDOCS, April 2, 2009, http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/04/senate-patent-refonn-
bill-s-515-voted-out-of-judiciary-committee.html (Bill S. 515 was voted out of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on April 2, 2009, albeit around much controversy and dissention). 
